The road to hell may be paved with good intentions, as the saying goes, but there’s a lot of understandable suspicion out there about exactly how good American intentions even are when it comes to the Middle East. That’s the theme of David Rohde’s book ‘Beyond War: Reimagining American Influence in the Middle East.’
The first step I’d suggest: do some major reimagining of images, and forget Orientalist stereotypes like the camel-rider on the cover. The second step: question the whole concept of influence.
The Catholic weekly America asked me to review the book, and here’s what I wrote:
When the Egyptian military seized power in June, American pundits instantly rushed to preach about democracy. This took some hubris considering that two recent American elections – 2000 and 2004 – are still considered by many to be of questionable legality, and that redistricting is rapidly ensuring the minority status of Democratic strongholds throughout the south.
Is the US even in a position to preach democracy? Especially since as with national elections, so too with foreign policy: democracy is subject to money, and how it’s spent.
This is the hard-headed reality behind two-time Pulitzer prize-winner and former Taliban captive David Rohde’s new book, which focuses on how the US government spends money abroad, specifically in the Middle East. It’s an argument for small-scale economic rather than large-scale military aid, and as such is immensely welcome in principle. The question is how to do it in practice.
As Rohde writes, “Washington’s archaic foreign policy apparatus” and its weakened civilian agencies mean that “in the decades since the end of the Cold War, the ability of the White House, State Department, and Congress to devise and carry out sophisticated political and development efforts overseas has withered.”
Whether Rohde is aware of it or not, the problem might be encapsulated in the subtitle of his own book, which assumes not only the existence of American influence, but also its necessity. Many of his sources are well-informed and palpably frustrated employees of the Agency for International Development (USAID) who are basically in conflict with both the State Department and Congress. Yet the stated goals of USAID are clear: they include providing “economic, development and humanitarian assistance around the world in support of the foreign policy goals of the US.” [my italics].
For all the talk about the need for humanitarian aid and intervention (most recently in Syria), the reality is purely political. What’s presented as humanitarian aid is always a matter of foreign policy. And American foreign policy is still intensely focused on George W. Bush’s GWOT – the “global war on terror.”
The principle is that US aid should act as a stabilizing force against militant Islamic extremism. But the very idea of the US as a stabilizing force has been thoroughly undermined by the disastrous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Even the best-considered foreign aid has now been rendered suspect in many parts of the Middle East, especially when there’s “a widespread perception of the American government as a finely tuned, nefarious machine, not an unwieldy cacophony of viewpoints,” and when authoritarian control fosters an intense rumor mill, with conspiracy theories rampant (most recently, for instance, Malala Yousufzai as a CIA plant, or American-backed ‘Zionists’ as the instigators of the new regime in Egypt). In Egypt in particular, Rohde notes, “Washington faces an extraordinary public-policy conundrum. Decades of support for Mubarak will not be forgotten overnight.”
Rohde details the conundrum in a series of country-by-country chapters, some intensively well-reported (particularly on civilian contractors’ takeover of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, and on the use of drones in Pakistan and Afghanistan), while others (on Turkey, Libya, and Tunisia) seem more perfunctory by comparison. But in the light of the June military coup, the chapter on American dollars-for-peace financing and the Egyptian army’s vast business empire is particularly fascinating and uncomfortably prescient.
Oddly, though, there is no chapter on Israel, the largest recipient of American aid. This seems to me tantamount to ignoring the elephant in the room, since the intense investment in an Israel that seems willing only to prolong and intensify the conflict with Palestine undermines US efforts elsewhere in the region. In fact you could make a pretty strong argument that American support of Israel, driven by domestic electoral politics, runs directly counter to its own foreign policy interests. Inevitably, the US is perceived elsewhere in the Middle East as at least tolerating if not encouraging Israel’s land grab in the Palestinian territories; if its funds do not literally finance the expansionist project, they certainly free up funds that do.
Even assuming the best American intentions, then, they’re all too often interpreted as the worst. But what exactly are those best intentions?
At root, this book is, or could have been, about America’s perception of itself. Are we the world’s greatest do-gooders, distributing our largesse (and our arms) where most urgently needed? Or are we acting to secure a blinkered and out-dated conception of our own interests?
Either way, as Rohde wrote in a New York Times op-ed back in May, “We should stop thinking we can transform societies overnight… Nations must transform themselves. We should scale back our ambitions and concentrate on long-term economics.” His economic recommendations are accordingly small-scale (sometimes to the level of pathos, as in his enthusiasm for an Egyptian version of ‘The Apprentice’). Yet his emphasis on entrepreneurship may actually undercut his argument that trying to force Western models on other countries will backfire. And this is the argument that matters.
Like Ambassador Chris Stevens in Libya, says Rohde, American officials need to listen rather than try to muscle their way in, whether economically or militarily. A little respect, that is. Preach less, listen more. That may not be much of a “reimagining,” but it’s the really important message of this book.
I agree with you Lesley. In reality after Eygptian over throw of Moursi next one was Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey. Turkey has much older democracy than Israel in Middle East but it is not in the interest of west to have strong Turkey with strong leader. West wants Soudi type regimes that will obey. Gezi park demonstrations at Istanbul in reality was an unsuccessful cue attempt of west. Thanks God it was unsuccessful. It would destabilize Turkey politically and economically and make Turkey again slave of west. Why West and Israil gov. Wants to get rid of Erdogan? Is he radical Islamist? No. Is he planing to bring sharia law back to Turkey ? No. If Turkey was a Christian state they would allow it to became another France or Germany but it is Muslim state very mellow understanding of Islam no treat to anybody but still even that much of Islam is not OK. There fore Turkey must remain as a third world country for western Judeo- Christian politicians.
I can understand why the author left Israel out. I may not like our policy in Israel but it is a very different problem than what is happening in the Muslim world. In the case of the Obama administration, I don’t think they have a clue as to what they want to accomplish. Their lack of real preparation has led to them to keeping the mistakes of the Bush administration in effect long after they have left town. For example the spying on Germany has been going on for 10 years.
Obama is a good administrator when he has a clear goal, but without ideas and without good advisors he is only a little better than an amateur.